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Implementing Human Rights
Conventions--The Soviet View
By JOHN CAREY*

THE THREE CONVENTIONS BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE

Four months to the day before his death, President Kennedy

asked the Senate to make the United States a party to three human
rights conventions. These conventions, already in force elsewhere,
deal with slavery, forced labor, and political rights of women.
The presidential request for advice and consent survived Mr.
Kennedy's death, and was graphically reiterated five months thereafter by a State Department spokesman who criticized ".

.

. the

spectacle of a United States Government too squeamish or too
indifferent to take a stand against human slavery or forced labor."'
The Senate is thereby confronted with a doubly novel situation. Not only is this the first time in ten years that a President
has actively sought ratification of a treaty in the human rights
area,2 but there is in addition an international novelty presented
by one of these conventions. The slavery pact has been joined
without reservation by members of the Soviet bloc, despite a
provision for compulsory adjudication of disputes at odds with the
0 Coudert Brothers, New
York; B.A., Yale University;

LL.B., Harvard
University.
'Harland Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, April 30, 1964, address before American Jewish Committee, Dept. of
State Press Release (un-numbered), p. 5; the omission of women's rights from
this phrase is curious.

2 In April 1953, Secretary of State Dulles assured the Senate that the United
States would neither join nor even help draft any pacts on human rights. The
Soviets took note of this U.S. action in International Law, A Textbook for Use in
Law Schools," Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Institute of State and Law,
Kozhevnikov ed., 477 (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961),
p. 139, hereinafter referred to as "the Soviet textbook". The Genocide Convention, unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, was sent
to the Senate by President Truman in June 1949. A Foreign Relations SubCommittee, after hearings in 1950, reported generally favorably to the full Comn-dttee, which discussed the matter in executive session. Little has transpired
since, aside from an effort in early 1964 by ten Senators to arouse Presidential
support for the Convention, N.Y. Times, March 21, 1964, p. 24.
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Soviets' normal objection to obligatory judicial interpretation of
treaties.
The phenomenon of Communist leaders, who normally defend
national sovereignty against supra-national tendencies as doggedly
as any American defender of the Connelly Amendment, in this
instance submitting to compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice gives interested American lawyers3 good
cause to contrast such submission with the normal Soviet view of
implementation of human rights conventions. The purpose of
this paper is to explore the Soviets' normal stand, and thus provide
a background for evaluation of what is at stake in joining the
slavery and the other two conventions. When one realizes how far
the Soviets departed from their normal position in submitting
in this instance to I.C.J. jurisdiction, one may perhaps better
assess how far the U.S. would be going by making a similar
submission.
THE SOVIET STANCE ON THE THREE CONVENTIONS

The Soviet Union itself is party to two of the three conventions. The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to
Slavery has been joined by it, and by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian
S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the
Ukrainian S.S.R., as well as by Albania and Yugoslavia.4 The
same group has joined the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, while Poland alone of this group is a party to the
3
Convention on Abolition of Forced Labor.
Any unsettled dispute regarding interpretation or application
of the slavery and women's rights conventions shall by their own
terms be referred "at the request of any one of the parties to the
dispute" to the International Court of Justice. The Forced Labor
3 As of this writing, approximately ten state or local bar associations in the

United States have committees studying the desirability of U.S. ratification of the
three conventions. The District of Columbia Bar Association has completed its
study and gone on record in favor of U.S. ratification.
4 49 U.S. Dept. of State, Bull. No. 320 (August 26, 1963), containing the
texts of the Conventions; reprinted as U.S. Dept. of State, Pub. 7597.
5 Id. See also the Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 142-43, declaring
Soviet support for conventions on women's rights. Aniong the 18 I.L.O. Conventions ratified by the U.S.S.R. between April and July, 1956 was one, in effect
since 1932, limiting forced or compulsory labor. 39 U.N. Treaty Series, pp. 55-81.
See Triska and Slusser, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties 591 (1962).
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Convention itself has no such provision, but falls within the
compulsory adjudication provisions of Articles 26 et. seq. of the
International Labor Organization's Constitution 6 against which
the Soviet Union, on its re-entry into ILO, attempted unsuccessfully in 1953 to lodge a reservation. 7 "No reservations may
be made," to the Slavery Convention under its Article 9, a
prohibition which the Soviet Union has officially recognized.8
All the Soviet-Bloc signatories of the Political Rights of
\Xomen Convention, except Yugoslavia, which should perhaps not
be so categorized, have made reservations against its compulsory
jurisdiction provision, Article 9, while also disputing the effectiveness of Article 7 to make the entire Convention non-operative
between a state making a reservation and a state objecting thereto,
rather than making just the provision reserved against nonoperative. 9
THE GENERAL SOVIET POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL
PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Soviets declare their adherence to the U.N. Charter
articles on promotion of human rights. The official Soviet textbook on "International Law" states that:
The democratic demands of progressive mankind for the extension of human rights and their implementation for all
without restriction have already been reflected in a number of
international legal documents. * * The Charter lays down
a number of... obligations regarding the encouragement and
promotion by States of respect for human rights. 10
However, the book goes on,
The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries *** at the
same time adhere to the position that international agreements
must not contain clauses infringing the sovereign rights of
States independently to define the rights and obligations of
their citizens in accordance with their economic and social
characteristics.
0 15 United Nations Treaty Series 40, 84 ff.
7 Schwelb, The Amending Procedure of Constitutions of International
Organizations, The British Year Book of International Law 94 (1954).

8 See the Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 271.

9

"Status of Multilateral Conventions," ST/LEG/8, Rev. 1, 4th Sup., pp.

XVI-8-11.
10 The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 137.
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That is to say, the substantive law of human rights is to be
determined unilaterally.
Nor should agreements contain clauses establishing any supraState agencies dealing with human rights and having legislative, administrative or judicial functions.
Thus, the procedural as well as the substantive law of human
rights must not be internationalized, according to this view.
The book then critizes "come capitalist States" which have
"attempted to use international human rights agreements as a
means of restricting the sovereign rights of States and for imperialist intervention in their internal affairs." The Soviet
position is restated in no uncertain terms:
The conclusion of international agreements to promote the
progressive development of civil, political and other human
rights does not imply any interference in domestic affairs or
infringement of the sovereign rights of States in this respect.
On the basis of the principle of respect for the sovereign
rights of all States, the Charter sets the U.N. the task of merely
encouraging the protection of human rights by the States
themselves and does not envisage any other safeguard other
than the State."
Thus the Soviet assertion of U.N. leadership on human rights
is ironically based on a stand that is limited as to both substance
and procedure. A further irony in their position lies in their
actual human rights practices at home. As the State Department
has pointed out,
The Soviet Union in recent years has sought to assert its
leadership in human rights issues before the United Nations.
There is a certain irony in this effort-an irony of which the
United Nations is frequently reminded not only by ourselves
but by other members. For the Soviet Union has adopted as
government policy a widespread disregard for those fundamental human rights which are embodied in the United
11 Id., at 139-140. See also Soviet Yearbook of International Law 370 (1958).
An echo of such assertions has been heard in Romania's declaration that cooperation in the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)
can only be on the basis of "full, equal rights, the observance of national
sovereignty and interests, mutual advantage, and comradely assistance," and in
her opposition to "some super-state authority" in economic matters. Christian
Science Monitor, May 8, 1964, p. 1.
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Nations12 Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
A similar charge was subsequently made by Supreme Court
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, who denied that Soviet mistreatment
of Jews is a solely internal matter, adding that it "transgresses the
United Nations Charter ...and violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is morally binding upon all member states of the United Nations."'*3 Justice Goldberg had previously advocated implementation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by means of a special international court modeled
on the European Court of Human Rights. 4 Earlier, Justice
Arthur J. Brennan, Jr., had suggested an International Court of
Habeas Corpus. 5
As seen, the Soviets' self-proclaimed leadership in U.N. human
rights matters is subject to the qualifications of precluding internationalization, either substantive or procedural, and allegedly
violating the Universal Declaration to which the U.S.S.R. is a
party. One may therefore reasonably question the purpose of
such leadership, and suspect that, like the drive for "peaceful
coexistence," the Soviet stance on human rights may be "a powerful instrument of Soviet foreign policy . . . widely utilized for
fortifying the position of the Soviet Union in the world and for
promoting Soviet interests in general.""' The position of the
12 Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs, address to World Jewish Congress, December 8, 1968, U.S.
Mission to U.N. Press Release No. 4333, p. 4.
13 N.Y. Times, April 6, 1964, p. 2.
14 N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1968, p. 26; N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1963, p. 17.
15 N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1962. In the early days of the U.N. Human Rights
Commission, Australia had proposed an International Court of Human Rights,
E/CN.4115, which was opposed by Iran as infringing state sovereignty.
EICN,4/SR.8, p. 2.
t Lapenna, The Legal Aspects and Political Significance of the Soviet
Concept of Co-Existence, 12 hIt. & Coinp. Law Quarterly 787, 774 (July, 1963).
"In its reports to the American Branch [of the International Law Association] in
1958 and in 1960, this committee [of the American Branch on Peaceful CoeAitence] expressed its distaste for the term 'peaceful coexistence' because the
term implied no more than an armistice in the struggle between states for
hegemony over neighbors or even over the entire world. Since 1961 the
Committees fear. ...has been confirmed by . .. Khrushchev in a speech...:
'Thus, in terms of its social content the policy of peaceful coexiastence is a form
of intensive economic, political and ideologica struggle of the proletariat against
the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena."' Proceedings
and Committee Reports of the American Branch of the I.L.A., 1961-1962, p. 72.
"At the very time when the slogans of peaceful co-existence are chanted
around the world by communist speakers, the evidence in doctrine and practice
(Continued on next page)
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Soviets' human rights stance within their "peaceful coexistence"
drive is illustrated in the Czechoslovak draft declaration of the
principles of peaceful coexistence 17 submitted to the U.N.'s Sixth
(Legal) Committee, during the seventeenth session, purportedly
to formulate eighteen "main principles -of contemporary international law." The Czechs included the "principle of the respect
for human rights" among the eighteen which they declared to be
"all the important elements in the development of the legal
principles and institutions [of the U.N. Charter] as they emerged
over the recent period and as correspond to the progressive trend
of development of the contemporary international community."' s
THE

GENERAL SOVIET VIEW ON JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

The Soviets generally oppose judicial interpretation of treaties
except by specific submission in each separate instance, preferring
interpretation by negotiation between the signatories. 19 Accord-

ingly they have refrained from submitting to any general international judicial jurisdiction. The Soviet textbook on "International Law" after omitting adjudication entirely from its
enumeration of "Means of Securing Performance of Treaties"
(pp. 273-5) explains in the following terms the Soviet Union's
relationship to the Permanent Court of International Justice:
iFootnote continued from preceding page)

screams of active communist support for foreign revolutionary activity and for
wars of national liberation, a support that provides funds, guns, and sanctuary
for the rebel factions." Falk, Appendix to Report of Committee on Peaceful
Coexistence; Proceedings and Committee Reports of the American Branch of the
I.L.A., 1963-1964, p. 100. The Soviet Union and East Germany expressed to
each other in the preamble to their Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and
Cooperation signed on June 12, 1964 the ". . . firm intention . . . to follow
unswervingly a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social
systems." New York Times, June 13, 1964, p. 2. "Peaceful coexistence means
don't interfere with what we are trying to do to you and there will not be any
shooting." Ryan, "A Semantic History of the World Communist Movement,
Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1964, p. 6. See also Red Coexistence
Excludes Ideology, Christian Science Monitor, May 8, 1964, p. 6; American Bar
Association, Peaceful Coexistence: A Communist Blueprint for Victory (August 7,
1964, p. 12,3 ).
17 A/C.61L.505.
18 Note verbale from Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic dated July 24, 1963,
quoted in "Comments Received from Governments Regarding Consideration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations," A/5470,
p. 17 .
19 Zile, "A Soviet Contribution to International Adjudication: Professor
Krylov's Jurisprudential Legacy," 58, 359, 365 (1964).
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The U.S.S.R., which was not a member of the League of
Nations until 1934 and which did not participate in the establishment of the Permanent Court, did not become a member
of it in 1934 insofar as participation in the League 20did not
mean obligatory participation in the Permanent Court.
At the San Francisco Conference on the organization of the U.N.,
the U.S.S.R. opposed compulsory jurisdiction for the International
Court of Justice, as did the U.S. and U.K. 21 Furthermore, the
Soviet Union, while a party to the Statute of the Court, rejected
its optional clause, Art. 36 (2), "on the grounds," according to
the official textbook, "that the jurisdiction of the Court should be
23
voluntary."2 2 The author of this explanation, Judge Krylov,

went further and said that I.C.J. jurisdiction not only should but
must be voluntary.24 Similarly one member of the Soviet bloc,
Romania, has suggested that the U.N. Charter forbids treaty
provisions for compulsory settlement of disputes by the I.C.J. 25

The Soviets further belittle the I.C.J. by denying it a prior
position on U.N. Charter construction. Says the official textbook:
The United Nations Charter can be interpreted only by the
United Nations agency which applies it. In the event of legal
differences between agencies arising from the interpretation
of the Charter, it is possible to appeal to any competent body,
including the International Court of Justice which may give
an advisory opinion. It should be noted that such an opinion
does not constitute an interpretation, since if it did, the International Court would constitute a body superior to the United
Nations 2Organization,
which would be contrary to the latter's
6
Charter.

On such grounds the U.S.S.R. opposed a 1947 General Assembly
recommendation urging U.N. organs to employ the I.C.J.'s
advisory jurisdiction.

27

2
0The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at Am. J. Intl L. 390. See also
Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 5, at 38.3-4. The U.S.S.R. had, however,
joined the Permanent Court of Arbitration by recognizing the Hague Conventions
and Declarations of 1899 and 1907. Op. cit. supra note 2, at 388.
21 Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 5, at 384. Zile, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 365-6.
22 The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 393.
23
Zile, op. cit. supra note 19, at 368, n. 63.
24

Id., at 369.

See A/C. 3/SR. 1274, pp. 14-15.
" The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 277-8.
27 See Zile, op. cit. supra note 19, at 373.
25
2
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The Soviet's opposition to compulsory adjudication of treaties
has naturally caused them to resist treaty clauses requiring
judicial settlement of disputes. Three treaties adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly contain such provisions, the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. 28 The Soviet Union made as to the
first of these a reservation that it did not consider itself bound
by the compulsory I.C.J. jurisdiction provision. 29 A similar reservation was made to the Genocide Convention, 30 accepting only
optional jurisdiction of the Court, whereupon the General Assembly sought an I.C.J. advisory opinion on the effect of reservations objected to by other parties to the Convention. 31 The
U.S.S.R. had argued for "the indisputable right of a State to make
reservations," pointed to the absence of any explicit limit on
reservations in this Convention, and urged simply that "those
provisions of a convention which were the subject of the reservation would not apply to relations between the State which made
the reservation and all other parties to the convention. ' ' 32 The
I.C.J. ruled that a reservation objected to by some of the parties
to a Convention does not bar the reserving state as a party "if the
reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the
Convention," 33 leaving it to each party whether the reservation is
compatible.
This opinion the Soviets welcomed as condoning their reservation against the same Court's compulsory jurisdiction; in the
28

Resolutions of the General Assembly Concerning the Law of Treaties,

Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat, Feb. 14, 1963, A/CN.4/154, paras.
95-7, p. 56, quoting the compulsory jurisdiction provisions.
29 The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 270-1. Similar reservations
were made by Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Mongolia, Romania, and Ukrainian S.S.R. ST/LEG/, Rev. 1, 4th Sup., pp.

III-6-8.01.
30 The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 270, pointing out that
similar reservations were also made by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian S.S.R.'s,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. Similar action was taken by
Albania and Hungary. ST/LEG/S, Rev. 1, 4th Sup., pp. IV-8, 9.
31 These events are desribed in A/CN.41154, cited note 28 supra, beginning
at p. 58.
32 Id., at 66.
33 I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15. For a formulation of this rule (not accepted
by the American member) and related rules by the International Law Commission, with its commentaries, see its Report covering the work of its Fourteenth
(1962) Session, A/CN.4/148, pp. 52-68.
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words of one commentary, this "ambivalent" ruling allowed the
Soviet Union "to have its cake and eat it, too. '34 Thenceforth it
was possible, at least so long as a convention did not explicitly
forbid reservations, 35 to enact theoretically binding legal commitments of sweeping exten 3 6 with no danger of having to account
in court. The Soviets were then quite free to complain that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not go far enough
37
in laying down legally binding rules.
The Soviet resistance to compulsory court jurisdiction over
treaties is manifested not only in reservations to completed pacts
but in preventive action to keep such clauses out or at least
separable from the substantive provisions. Judge Krylov fought
in both the International Law Commission and at the 1958
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to limit the
role of adjudication in that area. 38 The Romanians succeeded in
the General Assembly's Third Committee and again in the
Assembly itself in 1962 in excluding entirely from the Convention
on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages a U.S.-supported clause on compulsory I.C.J.
39
settlement of disputes.
The Soviet rejection of compulsory jurisdiction as an essential
for effective international law was expressed by Prof. G. I. Tunkin
in characterizing it as "a very fashionable concept among Western
3

4Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 5, at 369. See also pp. 384-5.

See International Law Commission, op. cit. supra note 31, at 53 and the
Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 271, both recognizing that reservations
may successfully be forbidden by a convention.
3 See, for example, the Soviet textbook's endorsement (p. 170) of the
principles of the Genocide Convention: The Soviet Union, proceeding from its
35

consistent policy of equality of all peoples, both large and small, is a signatory

of the3 Convention.
7 Soviet Yearbook of International Law 370 (1958). The Convention for
the Supression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution
of Others in force since 1951, provides in Article 22 for compulsory I.C.J. jurisdiction. Reservations on Article 22 were made by Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian
S.S.R., Hungary, Romania, Ukrainian S.S.R., and the U.S.S.R. ST/LEG/3, Rev.
1, 4th3 Sup., pp. VII-40-42.

8 Zile, op. cit. supra note 19, at 370-2. The Optional Protocol Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes accompanying the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations has not been signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian
S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian S.S.R., or U.S.S.R., but has
been signed by Yugoslavia. ST/LEG/S, Rev. 1, 4th Sup., pp. 111-51. A similar
Optional Protocol accompanies the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
which has itself not been signed by any of the above except Yugoslavia, which has
also signed the Protocol ST/LEG/3, Rev. 1, 4th Sup., pp. 111-57-9, 73-5.
29 See Y.U.N " 324 (1962). This exclusion was cited by Romania a year
later in the Third Comittee in su port of argument that compulsory jurisdiction
is not compatible with the U.N. Rlarter. A/C.3/SR 1274, pp. 14-15.
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international lawyers" but "only what I might call a practicing
lawyer's argument" which overlooks the fact "that the real
influence of international law, and I would say of law in general,
does not depend exclusively on the possibility of applying State
compulsion." 40 Tunkin states a preference for "making international law more effective than it is now" by means of "negotiation and other means of peaceful settlement of international
disputes, international conferences, international organizations
and many other possibilities." 41 To the same effect, the textbook
concludes in its discussion of "Interpretation of Treaties," that
".. . in the ultimate analysis, signatory States are as a rule the
interpreters of international treaties. Diplomatic negotiations are
the most common channel for such interpretation. '42 To the
supporting assertion that national sovereignty and equality of
states preclude any other method of interpretation an apt reply
was delivered by Prof. John N. Hazard at the 1960 meeting of
the International Law Association:
It is no answer to argue that disputed matters should be
resolved by diplomatic negotiations, for these negotiations
necessarily favor the stronger state. The result is violation
of the sovereignty we are all seeking to protect, for diplomatic
negotiations make possible in many cases dictation of the
stronger over the weaker. Protection of sovereignty requires
that each party to a dispute be treated equally without dicta-

tion of an inequitable result by the stronger. Constant reservation against jurisdiction -of the International Court of Justice,

as most recently evidenced in signature of the Law of the Sea
Conventions, must be discouraged by the scholars of the

world. American scholars are as critical of their own country's
practice on this score as of others. Claimants in the United

States object to jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice because they see domination of the Court by socialistminded elements. Yet statesmen in the East object to the
Court because they think it dominated by anti-socialist mentality. Objection on completely opposite grounds exposes the
40 Tunkin, International Law and Peace, included in International Law in a
Changing
World 77-8 (Oceana 1963).
41
Id. Similarly Chairman Khrushchev on Dec. 31, 1963, sent a message to
heads of state proposing an agreement including "a pledge to settle all territorial
disputes exclusively by peaceful means, such as negotiations, mediation and conciliation, as well as by other peaceful means according to the choice of the
interested parties and in conformity with the United Nations Charter." XVI
Current Digest of the Soviet Press No. 1, p. 6 (Jan. 29, 1964) (emphasis added).
42 The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 278.
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absurdity of the positions. It only provides evidence for the
conclusion that the Court is as43 important as any humanly
constituted body can be today.
Similar objections from Soviet and U.S. sources on opposite
grounds may also be seen by comparing with some U.S. opinion
the following passage from Prof. G. I. Tunkin's 1958 lectures at
the Hague Academy on "Coexistence and International Law:"
All plans tending towards organizing a world state or something close to that are, therefore, Utopian, as they do not
correspond to the laws of historical development in our epoch.
A plea for creating a world state and liquidating state sovereignty is, and we should not disguise this fact, detrimental to
international law, because it leads openly or by implication
to a depreciation of fundamental principles of international
law, such as respect for the sovereignty of States, nonintervention in the internal affairs of a State, etc.44
RECENT SOVIET ExPRESSIONS ON IMPLEMENTING
HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS

Debate is currently proceeding at the U.N. between the
Soviet self-regulation view and several other views on international human rights implementation. The arena for this debate
is the Third Committee, where Draft International Covenants
45
on Human Rights are under discussion.
The Draft Covenants were completed by the Human Rights
Commission 4" in 1954, for the purpose of making binding the
4'3Established by the U.N.
Charter Article 68.

Economic and Social Council pursuant to

rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. The rights concerned
are divided between the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Draft Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
As the categories of rights differ between the two Draft
Covenants, so do the proposed measures of implementation.
While the parties to the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
I.L.A., Report of the Forty-Ninth Conference 343 (1960).
95 Rague Recueil des Cours 651 (1958).
On December 23, 1963, the General Assembly in A/RES/1960 invited
comments, particularly from newer member states, on proposed means of
implementation.
43
44
45
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Covenant would undertake only to submit periodic progress
reports, 47 states joining the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,
besides having to report, would be subject to scrutiny by a Human
Rights Committee to which other member states could complain,
4s
whereafter the complainant could carry the case to the I.C.J.
The Committee's functions would make it, in the approving
Italian view, "virtually a subsidiary body of the International
49
Court of Justice.
The question of implementation of the Human Rights
Covenants, which has been called "the test of the sincerity
of governments in this matter," 0 was sure to arouse diverse
reactions in the case of the Civil and Political Rights. As noted,
Italy approved, saying, "It would, however, be wrong to argue
that in deference to the principle of respect for national sovereignty each State should be left at liberty to apply the Covenants
without international supervision." 51 Colombia agreed in principle to the Human Rights Committee since it felt free of guilt,
believed voluntary acceptance of international supervision to be
not a giving up of sovereignty but an exercise thereof, and considered the Covenants unnecessary if no supervisory organ was
set up.5 2 New Zealand said the Human Rights Committee and
compulsory adjudication provisions were ". .

nothing new to

international law: the International Labour Organization had
long had such a system and both the European Convention on
the Protection of Human Rights and the Inter-American draft
Convention on Human Rights had similar procedures which
were even more far-reaching. "5 The implementation provisions
of the latter two Conventions had been extensively compared
with those under discussion in an "Explanatory paper on measures
of implementation prepared by the Secretary-General," 54 at the
General Assembly's request, 55 In response to which the Soviet
47
Articles 17-25, quoted in Official Records of ECOSOC, 18th Session,
Supplement
6.
48
Articles 27-48, quoted in Official Records of ECOSOC cited supra, note 47.
9

4 A/C.3/SR.1273, p. 9 (Dec. 2, 1963).
S0 Jacob Blaustein, Human Rights-A Challenge to the United Nations and

to Our Generation, Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture, Dec. 4, 1963.
(Printed pamphlet).
51 AIC.3/SR.1273, p. 8.
52 Id., at 2-3.

53A/C.3/SR 1274, at 3 (Dec. 4, 1963).
54 A/5411 (April 29, 1963).
55 RES 1843 B (XVII) of Dec. 19, 1962.
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Union had set forth plainly its terms of legal reference for such
measures:
The draft Covenants must therefore contain measures of
implementation which correspond to the generally recognized
norms of international law and the principles of the United
Nations, i.e. which take into account the sovereign rights, the
particular economic, social and national characteristics of the
various States. The inclusion in the draft Covenants of any
measures of implementation that would open the door to interference in the internal affairs of States would be contrary to
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, would
complicate still further the consideration of this urgent question unjustifiably, and would not contribute to ratification of
the Covenants by the largest possible number of States. 56
The Soviet proposal for self-implementation and reporting was
then set forth:
The measures of implementation should be founded on the
obligation of States to adopt appropriate internal legislative,
administrative, social and other measures for the maintenance
and protection of human rights. That obligation together
with the additional obligation of States to inform the United
Nations regularly of the measures they are taking in conformity with the Covenants would form a proper basis for
achieving the human rights provided for in the Covenants.
The Third Committee heard the Soviet view in late 1963, when
the Civil and Political Rights implementation measures, consisting of complaints to the Human Rights Committee followed
by appeal to the I.C.J., were labeled "not only artifical" but
"likely to increase world tensions."5 7 Furthermore, the U.S.S.R.
argued that "...
by proposing that the International Court of
Justice would be vested with functions that were foreign to it,
[the draft] contravened the United Nations Charter and the
Statute of the Court, the texts of which would consequently have
to be amended at the cost of further protracted delays." The
reporting provisions of both draft Covenants were, however,
declared acceptable in principle.5 8
These arguments were carried on by Poland, which complained that appeals to the "in a sense... supra-national" Human
,6A/5411/Add. 1 (Aug. 21, 1963).
57A/C.8/SR.1278 (Dec. 2, 1963), p. 12.
5s Id., at 13.
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Rights Committee ". . . did not conform to the requirements of
international law, of which only States could be subjects."6 9
The relevance of this unusual Soviet view of international legal
personality, 6° in the light of the restriction to states in the draft
Covenant of the power to approach both the Committee and the
Court, was apparently not explained.
The Polish representative went on to declare the CommitteeCourt provisions "inconsistent with the principle of national
sovereignty recognized in Article 2 (7)" and "contrary to the
principle of the sovereign equality of States laid down in Article
2 (1) of the Charter," both of which provisions forbid "a supranational authority." Instead Poland urged dependence on the
principle "pacta sunt servanda" because of which the substantive
provisions of the Covenants would have "the force of law for the
parties and must be regarded as inviolable." 61 It was not set forth
why a state may not, consistent with its sovereignty, submit to
adjudication of disputes arising under a particular treaty. It
would seem that, if a state cannot make such a commitment
consistent with sovereignty, then the very rule "pacta sunt
servanda," which the Soviets approve, 62 should itself displease
them.
Poland closed its argument with the familiar Soviet assertion
that implementation should be limited to each state's obligation
"to take the necessary legislative, administrative, social or other
measures to ensure respect and protection for human rights...
supplemented by the obligation of States systematically to inform
the United Nations of the measures which they were taking to
63
give effect to the Covenants."
After Poland, Romania spoke in the Third Committee, construing U.N. Charter Articles 55, 56, 62, and 68 as intended to
promote unilateral respect for human rights and "not to organize
59 A/C.3/SR.1274 (Dec. 4, 1963), p. 5. "The Charter does not say that

man is an international-law subject; it simply envisages the possibility of help to

the states on the part of the United Nations in ensuring human rights." Soviet
Yearbook of International Law (1958), p. 370.
60 The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 90 states that "While not
subjects of International Law, physical persons may however be subjects of an
infringement of International Law and order and as a result bear a certain
responsibility. This was the basis for the sentences passed on the chief war

criminals by the Nuremburg and Tokyo military tribunals."
61
Id., at 6.
62

The Soviet textbook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 248.

63 A/C.3/SR.1274, at 7.
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international protection of those rights." 64 The speaker then
reiterated the Soviet dogma ". . . according to which international
law could not directly embody rights or obligations in respect of
individuals, who were not the subjects of law."
Continuing, Romania repeated the Soviet thesis that human
rights matters could not be dealt with unless the U.N. Charter
were amended. To this a proviso was added that the U.N. could
legally act if "the violation of such rights represented a threat to
the peace or impeded implementation of the Charter,"65 presumably because such a threat would bring into play the last clause
of U.N. Charter Article 2 (7), which authorizes U.N. intervention
in essentially domestic matters which threaten the peace. South
Africa's policy of apartheid was cited as a dispute beyond the
U.N.'s scope, being not a threat to international peace and
security, "the only ones which entitled the United Nations to
take action for the protection of human rights."66 No reason is
given why the Charter's domestic jurisdiction limitation, assuming
it had the Soviet's meaning, should not be amended pro tanto
by a treaty turning this particular matter over to international
regulation.
IMPLEMENTATION BY UNILATERAL REPORTINGAPPROVED BY THE SOVIETS

Romania in the Third Committee discussion divided into
categories the measures of implementation proposed in the draft
Covenants. "First, there was the system of reports to be subraitted by States (articles 17-23 of the draft Convenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and article 49 of the other
draft Covenant), to which the Romanian delegation had no
objection in principle." 67 Such reports, together with the formulation when necessary of recommendations by U.N. organs, were
61 Id., at 12.

1;5Id., at 13. On whether human rights violations threaten peace, the

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted

unaninously by the General Assembly on November 20, 1963, eight days before
the Third Committee debate under discussion, condemned discrimination "as an
obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and as a fact capable
of disturbing peace and security among peoples." Dag Hammarskjold had said
earlier "...
we know that the question of peace and the question of human

rights are closely related. Without recognition of human rights we shall never
have peace . . ." Blaustein, op. cit. supra note 50.
r67 A/C.3/SR.1274, at 14. See also U.N. Charter Article 55.
A/C.3/SR.1274, at 13.
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declared to be the only measures of implementation compatible
8
with the Charter and the principles of international law.
Periodic reports from governments on human rights are an
established U.N. measure, having been received triennially since
1956 by the Human Rights Commission69 after being summarized
by the Secretariat.70 This system is deficient, however, in the U.S.
view, since the Commission "regularly bypasses discussions of
current problems in specific countries" creating a vacuum filled
by the General Assembly with political discussion rather than
analytical review. 71 The British reaction to these reports to the
Commission is "that they often gave no indication of the level of
72
protection of human rights afforded in specific countries."
IMPLEMENTATION BY PUBLISHED COMPLAINTSREJECTED BY THE SOVIETS

The second category of implementation measure listed by
Romania in the Third Committee last fall was "the lodging df
complaints provided for under Article 40" of the Civil and
Political Rights Convention, "an innovation which was incompatible with the provisions of the Charter and the principles on
international law." 73 Apart from the question of the lodging of
human rights complaints from member states with a U.N. organ
other than the Assembly, there is ample precedent for nonAssembly receipt of such complaints from non-governmental
sources. Resolution 888B (XXXIV) (July 24, 1962) of the Eco68 Id., at 15.

69 For brief history, see Y.U.N. 320-321 (1962).
70 See for example, Periodic Reports or Human Rights for 1954-1956. Summary Prepared by the Secretary General, E/CN.41756 and 757; 1951-1959,
E/CN.4/810 and Add. 1 and 811.
71 Gardner, op. cit. supra note 12, at 3. The specificity avoided by the
Human Rights Commission but pursued by the Assembly is illustrated in the
"Note on Repressive Measures Against Opponents of the Policy of Apartheid in
the Republic of South Africa," issued by Assembly's Special Committee on
Apartheid. A/AC.115/L.48 (Feb. 27, 1964). It has been reported that the
American Negro leader Malcolm X has the ". . . intention to have one or more
African Governments start the 'internationalization' [of the U.S. Negro's problems]
process by opening an inquiry in the Human Rights Commission of the United
Nations." New York Times, August 13, 1964, p. 22.
72 E/CN.4/SR.811 (March 18, 1964), p. 6. A recent commentary concludes
that progress in human rights, both substantive and procedural, might be
achieved if the General Assembly reversed ECOSOC's 1947 decision that the
Human Rights Commission may not act on private complaints, allovAng the
Commission then to investigate and recommend. McDougal and Bebr., Human
Rights in the United Nations, 58 Am. J. Int. Law 603, 640 (July 1964).
73 A/C.3/SR.1274, at 14, 15.
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nomic and Social Council invited non-governmental organizations
which have consultative status with ECOSOC under Charter
Article 71 "to submit comments and observations of an objective
character" to help the Human Rights Commission in its consideration of the Secretariat's summaries of the Member States'
triennial reports. However, NGO communications complaining
against particular governments are kept confidential: Also kept
confidential are the hundreds of complaints that flow each year
to the Secretariat's Division of Human Rights, whose head is
reported to have said "unfortunately our technique is only an
elaborate wastepaper basket. ' '7 4 Such complaints are ".

.

. sum-

narized in a confidential list furnished to the members of the
Commission every year at private meetings; the identity of the
writers is not disclosed unless they have indicated that there is no
objection to disclosure. Copies of the communications summarized for the confidential list are sent to any United Nations
Member State specifically referred to in the communications, and
any reply which a Government might send is submitted to the
Commission together with the confidential list." 75 Other com-

munications are summarized in a non-confidential list submitted
every year to the Commission.
The opposite of confidentiality is the rule in the General
Assembly's Fourth Committee when petitioners from non-selfgoverning and trust territories are publicly heard from in complaints against the administering power, 76 which is itself obliged
by Charter Articles 73 (e) or 88 to report to the Secretary-General
or General Assembly. 77 Publicity is also given to petitions received
by the Assembly's Special Committee on the situation with regard
to Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which are given
general distribution in mimeographed form. 78
7
.1Peter
75

Lyon, "A World Without Slaves," Holiday Magazine, Sept., 1961.
Y.U.N., 351 (1962).
76Y.U.N., 426-7, 472 (1961).

77The subjects of such reports are "political, economic, social, and educa-

tional" under Art. 88 but only "economic, social and educational' under Art.
73(e). However, a number of states reporting under Art. 73(e) include
political
information. Y.U.N. 417 (1961).
78
See, for example, Two Petitions from Mr. Albert Nank Concerning Angola,
calling attention to "the murders and atrocities that are now being perpetrated in [Portuguese West Africa] and in all the other colonies by the ruling
colonial power, the Portuguese." AIAC.1I0gPET. 233 (April 28, 1964).
(Continued on next page)
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The Secretary General's Explanatory Paper on Implementation, in summarizing the arguments for and against allowing
individuals and non-governmental organizations to petition, recited the argument that ". . the experience of the Trusteeship
Council and of the ILO did not bear out the fear that the right
of petition would release a flood of malicious and groundless complaints which might overwhelm the permanent organ and paralyze its actions . .. ,,
Despite these precedents for publication of non-governmental
complaints against member states, the Soviet Union resists such
airing in human rights matters.80 The Human Rights Commission
in March, 1964 heard a U.S. proposal s' for a committee which,
besides examining periodic reports from governments, would
peruse "material received from non-governmental organizations."
The Soviet Union complained that "Throughout the existence
of the United Nations, communications from non-governmental
organizations containing complaints against Member States had
not been considered documents of the Commission on Human
Rights."8 2 The proposed procedure, they said, ". . . could be
interpreted as a form of implementation" but going further than
the draft International Covenants on Human Rights, under which
8 3
only States could lodge such complaints.
It may be safely assumed that the Soviets would resist, even
more strongly than they fought published NGO reports, the
open submission of individuals' complaints about particular governments, especially when so pro-implementation a country as
Colombia joined the majority opposing individuals' petitions to
the Human Rights Committee to be created by the draft Covenant
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

The Special Committee not only receives petitions publicly but also effectively
passes judgment in public. See resolution it adoptedApril 27, 1964 in which it
"Requests the Government of the United Kingdom to take the necessary steps
with a view to the immediate release of Mr. Nkomo and other political prisoners
detained under the arbitrary laws of the minority Government of Southern
Rhodesia." A/AC.109/68 (April 27, 1964).
79A/5411 (April 29, 1963), p. 20. The same report at pp. 18, 26 points to
similar provisions in the European Convention on Human fights and Fundamental
Freedoms and the Inter-American Draft Covenant on Human Rights.
80 As early as January 1947 a Soviet representative resisted a proposal for
individuals' petitions to the U.N. E/CN.4/SR.13, at 3.
81 E/CN.4/L.716, jointly sponsored by Costa Rica and Dahomey.
82 E/CN.4/SR.811 (March 18, 1964), p. 13.
83 Id., at 14.
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on Civil and Political Rights. Colombia told the Assembly's
Third Committee it felt that "only States, as the subjects of international law, should have the right of recourse to the [Human
84
Rights] Committee.1
IMPLEMENTATION BY THIRD-PARTY INVESTIGATIONREJECTED BY THE SOVIETS

The proposed Human Rights Committee would be a "subsidiary organ of the United Nations," said Romania of the third
of its categories of implementation measures in the Civil and
Political draft Covenant. Such subsidiary could not be given
powers greater than the Assembly or ECOSOC had. Likewise
Romania held Article 46 to be contrary to the principle that
I.C.J. jurisdiction is optional, citing the "all cases which the
parties refer to it" language of I.C.J. statute Article 36 but
omitting the succeeding provision for jurisdiction over "all matters specifically provided for . . . in treaties and conventions in
force."
The Romanians' third category of implementation measures
comprises both fact-finding by the proposed Human Rights Committee and also adjudication by the I.C.J., functions which blend
together in this area and may for present purposes be joined
under the category of third-party investigation. The Soviet
resistance would seem to mark for similar treatment a number of
recent proposals for international scrutiny. Two of such proposals, by Justices Goldberg and Brennan, which have been
mentioned above, called for judicial scrutiny. Others contemplate
executive action by a new U.N. official.
Proposals have been made for a U.N. High Commissioner on
Human Rights. Uruguay urged this at the U.N.'s Sixth (1951) 85
and Tenth (1955) s Sessions. In December, 1963, Mr. Jacob Blaustein, in the course of a Dag Hammarskjold Memorial Lecture at
Columbia University, made a similar suggestion, coupled with the
doubt that ".. . any appreciable number of governments would be
ready to vote for such a solution .... let alone ratify a treaty which
84 A/C.3/SR.1273 (Dec. 2, 1963), p. 3.
858 A/C.3/564.

A12929, at 84-5.
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would subject them to the possibility of being hauled before an
international tribunal by an individual or non-governmental
organization."8 7
It is understood that during the summer of 1963 U.S. officials
were considering a proposal for a U.N. Human Rights Rapporteur, who could supplement from public sources (without
hearings, on-the-spot investigations, or solicitation of further
information from member states) the member states' reports to
the U.N., which would be annual instead of triennial and which
would be available in full to the Human Rights Commission. In
view of the Soviets' refusal of any implementation procedures
more advanced than unilateral reporting by national governments,
it seems clear that they would resist any such measures involving
third-party investigation by a U.N. official.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Three human rights conventions implemented by compulsory
adjudication are now before the U.S. Senate. In considering
ratification, the Senate will be confronted with prior ratification
of one of these Conventions by members of the Soviet bloc.
These Soviet ratifications may be contrasted with the usual Soviet
view of implementation of human rights conventions.
The Soviets' usual view on implementation of human rights
conventions is consistent in its restrictiveness with their opposition
to judicial interpretation of all treaties. Their reservation in 1951
against implementation of the Genocide Convention is being
followed today in their drive to cut from the U.N. Draft
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights its provisions on public
complaints and third-party investigation.
The Soviet bloc's ratification without reservation of the
Slavery Convention now before the U.S. Senate appears to depart
from their usual position, unless this Convention is considered so
unlikely to be often enforced as to hold no fears even for
champions of national sovereignty as vigorous as the Soviets.
87 Blaustein, op. cit. supra note 50, at 15, 22-3.

